Summary information

Study title

Formal Models of Political Behaviour in Europe, 1945-1972

Creator

Schofield, N., University of Essex

Study number / PID

193 (UKDA)

10.5255/UKDA-SN-193-1 (DOI)

Data access

Restricted

Series

Not available

Abstract

Abstract copyright UK Data Service and data collection copyright owner.


To collect data in order to test various game theoretic predictions in coalition payoffs in simple voting games. The variables relate to party size, coalition size and portfolio (i.e. cabinet positions associated with Government) distribution in all multi-party coalition governments in twelve West European governments during the period 1945 - 1972.
Main Topics:

Variables
Country, rank of party, number of governments since last election, size of party (= no. of seats held) size of coalition(= no. of seats in coalition). Number of portfolios held by party, number of portfolios held by coalition, date of government formation, duration of coalition (in days) predicted kernel (i.e. payoff prediction notion, similar to the bargaining set, developed for games with transferable value), payoff, kernel payoff in coalition, number of parties in coalition.

Methodology

Data collection period

01/01/1974

Country

Multi-nation, Western Europe

Time dimension

Cross-sectional (one-time) study

Analysis unit

Institutions/organisations
Cross-national
National
Legislatures

Universe

European parliaments in twelve democracies, 1945 - 1972

Sampling procedure

No sampling (total universe)

Kind of data

Not available

Data collection mode

Compilation of published data and regression analysis

Access

Publisher

UK Data Service

Publication year

1975

Terms of data access

The Data Collection is available to UK Data Service registered users subject to the End User Licence Agreement.

Commercial use of the data requires approval from the data owner or their nominee. The UK Data Service will contact you.

Related publications

  • Schofield, N. (1974) Game Theory and applications in politics [Research report], : ECPR Summer School.
  • Schofield, N. (1976) 'The kernel and payoffs in European government coalitions', Public Choice, 29-49