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Two experiments on cooperation and reputation in networks
The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis by Raub and Weesie (1990) that embeddedness in social networks fosters cooperation in repeated dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemmas via reputation effects. Data were collected in two computerized laboratory experiments. In the experiments, subjects played 40 rounds of a game in which they played dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemmas with the...
Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas 2012-2015
We investigate the link between leadership, beliefs and pro-social behavior in social dilemmas. This link is interesting because field evidence suggests that people's behavior in domains like charitable giving, tax evasion, corporate culture and corruption is influenced by leaders (CEOs, politicians) and beliefs about others’ behavior. Our framework is a repeated...
Peer effects and social preferences in voluntary cooperation: A theoretical and experimental analysis
Social preferences and social influence effects (“peer effects”) are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent payoffs between two agents we find causal evidence for peer effects. Efforts are...
Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games
We investigate the effects of information feedback in rent-seeking games with two different contest structures. In the share contest a contestant receives a share of the rent equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures, while in the lottery contest a contestant wins the entire rent with probability equal to her share of rent-seeking expenditures. In share contests...
Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons
Social cooperation often requires collectively beneficial but individually costly restraint to maintain a public good 1,2,3,4, or it needs costly generosity to create one 1,5. Status quo effects 6 predict that maintaining a public good is easier than providing a new one. Here, we show experimentally and with simulations that even under identical incentives, low levels of...