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BARGAINING THEORY
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Efficiency, equality, and labelling: An experimental investigation of focal points in explicit bargaining
We investigate Schelling’s hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels
(“cues”) can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with
communication. In our experimental games, players negotiate over
the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have
payoff-irrelevant spatial locations. Negotiation occurs in continuous
time, constrained by a deadline. In some games,...
Standing united or falling divided? High stakes bargaining in a TV game show
We examine high stakes three-person bargaining in a game show where contestants bargain over a large money amount that is split into three unequal shares. We find that individual behavior and outcomes are strongly influenced by equity concerns: those who contributed more to the jackpot claim larger shares, are less likely to make concessions, and take home larger amounts....