2026-04-16T03:29:52Z https://datacatalogue.cessda.eu/oai-pmh/v0/oai

f35b4837b8a345138bbd04ef8e61850a799f72244f834ff76b62fb3cd9a5225d 2025-06-17T03:14:56Z language:enopenaire_data

DDI study level documentation for study 10.7802/1927 Replication data: Natural and Strategic Generosity as Signals of Trustworthiness Replication data: Natural and Strategic Generosity as Signals of Trustworthiness Replication data: Natural and Strategic Generosity as Signals of Trustworthiness 10.7802/192710.7802/192710.7802/192710.7802/1927 Gambetta, Diego Gambetta, Diego Przepiorka, Wojtek Przepiorka, Wojtek GESIS Data Archive for the Social SciencesGESIS Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften We exploit the fact that generosity and trustworthiness are highly correlated and the former can thus be a sign of the latter. Subjects decide between a generous and a mean split in a dictator game. Some of them are informed from the start that afterwards they will participate in a trust game and that their choice in the dictator game may matter; others are not informed in advance. In the trust game, before trusters decide whether or not to trust, some trustees can reveal (or conceal) only their true choice in the dictator game, while others can say to trusters, truthfully or otherwise, what they chose. We find that a generous choice made naturally by uninformed trustees and reliably revealed is more effective in persuading trusters to trust than a generous choice that could be strategic or a lie. Moreover, we find that, when they can, mean subjects lie and go on to be untrustworthy.We exploit the fact that generosity and trustworthiness are highly correlated and the former can thus be a sign of the latter. Subjects decide between a generous and a mean split in a dictator game. Some of them are informed from the start that afterwards they will participate in a trust game and that their choice in the dictator game may matter; others are not informed in advance. In the trust game, before trusters decide whether or not to trust, some trustees can reveal (or conceal) only their true choice in the dictator game, while others can say to trusters, truthfully or otherwise, what they chose. We find that a generous choice made naturally by uninformed trustees and reliably revealed is more effective in persuading trusters to trust than a generous choice that could be strategic or a lie. Moreover, we find that, when they can, mean subjects lie and go on to be untrustworthy. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland In total, 215 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were Oxford University students, 46% were female and they were 23.4 (sd = 4.91) years old on average. All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) in Oxford. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment.All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS) in Oxford. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment. Laboratory experimentExperiment.LaboratoryLaborexperimentExperiment.Laboratory Free access (without registration) - The research data can be downloaded directly by anyone without further limitations. CC BY-NC-SA 4.0Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung) - Die Forschungsdaten können von jedem direkt heruntergeladen werden. CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 http://dbkapps.gesis.org/dbkoai/oai.asp oai:dbk.gesis.org:SDN/10.7802_1927 2023-03-11 ddi:codebook:2_5