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DDI study level documentation for study 10.7802/2557 Replication files: The emergence of conventions in the repeated volunteer's dilemma: The role of social value orientation, payoff asymmetries and focal points Replication files: The emergence of conventions in the repeated volunteer's dilemma: The role of social value orientation, payoff asymmetries and focal points Replication files: The emergence of conventions in the repeated volunteer's dilemma: The role of social value orientation, payoff asymmetries and focal points 10.7802/255710.7802/255710.7802/255710.7802/2557 Przepiorka, Wojtek Przepiorka, Wojtek Bouman, Loes Bouman, Loes de Kwaadsteniet, Erik de Kwaadsteniet, Erik GESIS Data Archive for the Social SciencesGESIS Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften conventionsocial normcollective behaviorlaboratory experimentconventionsocial normcollective behaviorlaboratory experiment Conventions are arbitrary rules of behavior that coordinate social interactions. Here we study the effects of individuals' social value orientations (SVO) and situational conditions on the emergence of conventions in the three-person volunteer's dilemma (VOD). The VOD is a step-level collective good game in which only one actor's action is required to produce a benefit for the group. It has been shown that if actors interact in the payoff-symmetric VOD repeatedly, a turn-taking convention emerges, resulting in an equal distribution of payoffs. If the VOD is asymmetric, with one “strong” actor having lower costs of volunteering, a solitary-volunteering convention emerges by which the strong actor volunteers earning less than others. In study 1 we test whether SVO promotes turn-taking and hampers solitary-volunteering. We find that groups with more prosocials engage less in turn-taking and no effect of SVO on the emergence of solitary-volunteering. In study 2 we test whether making one actor focal is sufficient for solitary-volunteering to emerge. We find instead that payoff asymmetry with one strong actor is a necessary precondition. We discuss explanations for our findings and propose directions for future research.Conventions are arbitrary rules of behavior that coordinate social interactions. Here we study the effects of individuals' social value orientations (SVO) and situational conditions on the emergence of conventions in the three-person volunteer's dilemma (VOD). The VOD is a step-level collective good game in which only one actor's action is required to produce a benefit for the group. It has been shown that if actors interact in the payoff-symmetric VOD repeatedly, a turn-taking convention emerges, resulting in an equal distribution of payoffs. If the VOD is asymmetric, with one “strong” actor having lower costs of volunteering, a solitary-volunteering convention emerges by which the strong actor volunteers earning less than others. In study 1 we test whether SVO promotes turn-taking and hampers solitary-volunteering. We find that groups with more prosocials engage less in turn-taking and no effect of SVO on the emergence of solitary-volunteering. In study 2 we test whether making one actor focal is sufficient for solitary-volunteering to emerge. We find instead that payoff asymmetry with one strong actor is a necessary precondition. We discuss explanations for our findings and propose directions for future research. NetherlandsNetherlands University students and employees Non-probability Sample - Availability SampleNon-probability Sample - Availability Sample Laboratory experimentExperiment.LaboratoryLaborexperimentExperiment.Laboratory Free access (without registration) - The research data can be downloaded directly by anyone without further limitations. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: Attribution - NonCommercial – NoDerivatives (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de)Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung) - Die Forschungsdaten können von jedem direkt heruntergeladen werden. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: Attribution - NonCommercial – NoDerivatives (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de) http://dbkapps.gesis.org/dbkoai/oai.asp oai:dbk.gesis.org:SDN/10.7802_2557 2023-05-03 ddi:codebook:2_5