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DDI study level documentation for study 10.7802/1415 Tipping Versus Cooperating To Supply A Public Good Tipping Versus Cooperating To Supply A Public Good Tipping Versus Cooperating To Supply A Public Good 10.7802/141510.7802/141510.7802/141510.7802/1415 Dannenberg, Astrid Dannenberg, Astrid ERC Starting Grant “Human Cooperation to Protect the Global Commons” GESIS Data Archive for the Social SciencesGESIS Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften In some important multiplayer situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision by a group with fixed membership, playing over a finite number of periods, to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma, the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best outcome is attainable, but cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. In the tipping game, only a second best outcome may be attainable, but there exists a Nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the prisoners’ dilemma. We show that many groups persistently choose the prisoners’ dilemma despite its strategic disadvantage, and that the groups that eventually choose the tipping game do better than the ones that stick with the prisoners’ dilemma. <br> The work was financially supported by the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies and the ERC Starting Grant “Human Cooperation to Protect the Global Commons” (HUCO, Project number: 636746).In some important multiplayer situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision by a group with fixed membership, playing over a finite number of periods, to choose between a “tipping” game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good provided enough other players contribute, and a prisoners’ dilemma, the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best outcome is attainable, but cannot be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. In the tipping game, only a second best outcome may be attainable, but there exists a Nash equilibrium that is strictly preferred to the one in the prisoners’ dilemma. We show that many groups persistently choose the prisoners’ dilemma despite its strategic disadvantage, and that the groups that eventually choose the tipping game do better than the ones that stick with the prisoners’ dilemma. <br> The work was financially supported by the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies and the ERC Starting Grant “Human Cooperation to Protect the Global Commons” (HUCO, Project number: 636746). GermanyGermany undergraduate students recruited from the general student population of Magdeburg University, Germany Random SelectionRandom Selection Laboratory experimentExperiment.LaboratoryLaborexperimentExperiment.Laboratory Free access (with registration) - The research data can be downloaded by registered users.Freier Zugang (mit Registrierung) - Die Forschungsdaten können von allen registrierten Nutzerinnen und Nutzern heruntergeladen werden. http://dbkapps.gesis.org/dbkoai/oai.asp oai:dbk.gesis.org:SDN/10.7802_1415 2023-03-11 ddi:codebook:2_5