2026-05-01T16:08:04Z https://datacatalogue.cessda.eu/oai-pmh/v0/oai

65e4b8f00d48c266dd08bdb29a0f1e00431a1ac1091af226874e1389663e82b1 2025-06-17T03:14:55Z language:enopenaire_data

DDI study level documentation for study 10.7802/1926 Replication data: Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts Replication data: Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts Replication data: Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts 10.7802/192610.7802/192610.7802/192610.7802/1926 Fehrler, Sebastian Fehrler, Sebastian Przepiorka, Wojtek Przepiorka, Wojtek GESIS Data Archive for the Social SciencesGESIS Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften GruppeRollePersönlichkeitGesellschaftKulturGruppeRollePersönlichkeitGesellschaftKultur It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences. SchweizSchweiz In total, 112 subjects participated in our computerized laboratory experiment. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich, 57% were female and they were 23.5 years old on average (sd = 6.31). All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment.All participants in our experiment were recruited from the subject pool maintained by the University Registration Center for Study Participants (UAST) of the University of Zurich and ETH Zurich. A random sample of participants was drawn from this subject pool and people included in this sample were invited via e-mail to participate in the experiment. Laboratory experimentExperiment.LaboratoryLaborexperimentExperiment.Laboratory Free access (without registration) - The research data can be downloaded directly by anyone without further limitations. CC BY-NC-SA 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de)Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung) - Die Forschungsdaten können von jedem direkt heruntergeladen werden. CC BY-NC-SA 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.de) http://dbkapps.gesis.org/dbkoai/oai.asp oai:dbk.gesis.org:SDN/10.7802_1926 2023-03-11 ddi:codebook:2_5