2026-04-15T16:04:45Z https://datacatalogue.cessda.eu/oai-pmh/v0/oai

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DDI study level documentation for study 10.7802/2558 Replication files: Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game Replication files: Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game Replication files: Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game 10.7802/255810.7802/255810.7802/255810.7802/2558 Przepiorka, Wojtek Przepiorka, Wojtek Diekmann, Andreas Diekmann, Andreas GESIS Data Archive for the Social SciencesGESIS Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften KooperationGemeinwohlRückkopplungNachhaltigkeitLaborexperimentKooperationGemeinwohlRückkopplungNachhaltigkeitLaborexperiment In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public.In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects’ payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote sustainable behavior. We find that cooperation is higher in groups where a contract can be signed or where subjects made a promise to cooperate throughout the experiment. However, not all groups sign the contract unanimously and subjects who made a promise adjust their cooperation downwards over time. We find no difference between the control condition without any regulation and the treatment condition in which subjects receive feedback on their past behavior in private. However, if received feedback can be learned by all group members, cooperation is significantly higher. Our findings show that non-binding promises and social feedback increase cooperation, but the former only in the short-run and the latter only if made public. SchweizSchweiz University students and employees Nicht-Wahrscheinlichkeitsauswahl - Willkürliche AuswahlNicht-Wahrscheinlichkeitsauswahl - Willkürliche Auswahl Laboratory experimentExperiment.LaboratoryLaborexperimentExperiment.Laboratory Free access (without registration) - The research data can be downloaded directly by anyone without further limitations. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitung (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de)Freier Zugang (ohne Registrierung) - Die Forschungsdaten können von jedem direkt heruntergeladen werden. CC BY-NC-ND 4.0: Namensnennung - Nicht kommerziell – Keine Bearbeitung (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de) http://dbkapps.gesis.org/dbkoai/oai.asp oai:dbk.gesis.org:SDN/10.7802_2558 2023-05-05 ddi:codebook:2_5